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Paper No. 2 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 
I N  CROATIA , YUGOSLAVIA I N  THE 1 970 'S  AND 1 980 ' S .  
by Jure Kristo 
J1..rre Kristo is native of Croatia, Yugoslavia.  He came 
to the United States in 1 972 and attended the University 
of :Notre Dame where he obtained his doctorate in 1 979.  
The focus of his graduate work was the phenomenology of 
regigious experience . He has taught at various univer­
sities here and has lectured abroad. He is presently 
associated with the I nstitute of Pastoral Studies at 
Loyola University in Chicago . Dr. Kristo has contributed 
several articles to prominent journals here and abroad . 
His most recent publication is "The Interpretation of 
Religious Experience : i'lhat Do Hystics Intend when they 
Talk about their Experiences? " in the Journal of Religion. 
The relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the communist re ­
gime in Yugoslavia is almost as bad now as in the immediate postwar period 
( 1 945-1 953 ) . The Communist Party began its relentless,  organized attack on 
the Catholic Church in 1 971 through the media and othe:- channels ; this on­
slaught peaked in 1 981 . Unreasonable , escalated anti-religious propaganda, 
and imprisonment of a number of priests took place . The attack on the Roman 
Catholic Church in the 80 ' s  is being led by the same people , together with 
their followers , who led the attack in the 40 ' s .  Jakov BlaZevic, who was 
the state prosecutor during the infamous trial of · Cardinal Alousius Stepinac 
(pronounced Stepinatz ) in 1 946 , renewed his bitter criticism of the "Stepinac 
church "  in Croatia in the beginning of 1981 . 1 Ever since , there is rarely a 
day in which an article in the neHspapers or a special on the radio or tele­
vision is not addressed to the criticism of the Roman Catholic Church nnd ±ts 
role among Croatians . This may be an indication of the political situation 
in Croatia and, more broadly, in Yugoslavia, which further complicates the 
analysis .  
The relationship betHeen the church and state i n  Yugoslavia, particularly 
1-rhen it is a question of the Roman Catholic Church, is as complex as the 
political structure of Yugoslavia. Consequently , one must proceed carefully and 
try to be as clear as possible . First , a short historical survey of the sit­
uation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia -vrill be given. Then an analysis 
of the present status of the relationship between church and state will be 
attempted . Finally , a feif propositions about the possible improvement of the 
22 
23 
relationship between the Catholic Church and the c ommunist regime in Yugoslavia 
will follow. 
l .  Catholic Church in Yugoslavia--A Painful History 
C omprehend ing something necessarily implies knowing i ts history . This is 
also true about C roatian people and the Catholic Church in its midst . A closer 
look at a map of Yugoslavia reveals that it is composed of s ix states (called 
re publ ics) and two autonomous regions . The states c omprise , roughly , respect­
ive nations . Rel igiously , Yugoslavia can be divided into two sphere s . The 
East , comprising Serbia , Maced onia and M ontenegro , is predominantly Orthodox 
with substantial minorities of Albanian Moslems in Kosovo-Metohi ja and C roatian 
Catholics and other minorit ies in Vojvod ina .  The West , c omprising Croatia , 
Bosnia and Hercegovina , and Slovenia , is Roman Catholic with substantial Ortho­
dox and Moslem minorities in Croatia and in Bosnia and Hercegovina . Unti l  
1919 , the Catholic West together with Vojvodina were part o f  the Austro-Hungar­
ian empire . In 1919 , the C roatians and Slovenians decided to join the kingdoms 
of Serbia and Montenegro in order to form the kingdom of Sl ovenians , Croatians , 
and Serbians , later renamed Yugoslavia . From the beginning , a c lash occurred 
between two opposing views concerning the structure of the state . On one hand , 
the Serbians showed hegemonistic tendencies by envisaging all the other nations 
as an avenue for c reating the so-call ed Great Serbia . On the other hand , Croa­
tians advocated a federalism that would give every nation a relative autonomy 
and equal treatment . Tension between Serbia and Croatia marked the political 
life in Yugoslavia between 1919 and 1941 . 
This political tension was reflected in the religious sphere as well . The 
Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church was e stablished immediately and com­
prised many metropol itanates throughout the new state . The Vatican recognized 
the new state and d iplomatic relations were established . The Vatican al s o  tried 
to regulate its relationship with the state by a c oncordate . This c oncordate 
was signed in 1935 , but the Serbian Orthodox Church opposed it vehemently . To 
many Catholics in the country it seemed that the Serbian Orthod ox Church wanted 
to continue having the privi lege of the state rel igion which it enjoyed i n  the 
kingdom before unification with other nations . The other nations in the state 
felt they were in a subordinate positi on to the Serbians and the Serbian Orthod ox 
Church . The C roatians in p articular resented this situation . 
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The atrocities committed by certain e lements in both nations , during 
World War II were a direct c onsequence of the tensi on created by their unequal 
status . With generous help from the Allies , the C ommunist Party , led by Josip 
Broz Tito , come to power in 1945 in what was called the New Yugoslavia . 
The Catholic population was generally afraid of "godless communism" 
before it had any firsthand experience of it . The Communist Party of Yugoslavj a 
made sure that the peopl e ' s fears were justified . Almost immediately after 
taking power, The C ommunist Party organized numerous trials .  Stella Alexander 
best describes these trials when she says that they were " swift , ruthless , with 
few l egal trimmings , and identifying precisely the objects of the authoritie s '  
vengeance . "2 The archbishop o f  Zagreb , Al oysius Stepinac , was immediately 
arrested . There was an attempt to convince the Catholic hierarchy to secede 
from the Vatican and create a national Catholic Church modeled after national 
Orthodox churches .  When the proposal was flatly refused and when Archbishop 
Stepinac raised his voice against the unfounded imprisonments and senseless 
kill ings of bishops , priests , and the faithful , the Party decided to stage the 
trial of Archbishop Stepinac himself . He was sentenced to sixteen years at 
hard labor. J 
From then on , the history of the relationship between the Catholic Church 
and the state in Yugoslavia was marked by ups and downs . It is important to 
bear in mind that the improvement and worsening of this relaionship did not 
depend exclusively on the willingness or lack of it of either the Catholic 
hierarchy or the C ommunist Party but l ikewise on the internal restructuring of 
the Party and on gl obal international relations . 
The decade of the 50 ' s was for the Cathol ic Church a decade of continued 
repression and persecution . The Communist Party itself was going through some 
kind of "identity crisis" , since it was ousted in 1948 from the communist al­
liance led by the Soviet Union . In 1952 , Archbishop Stepinac , under house ar­
rest , was e levated to ca!U inal , which angered the Communist Party (newly renamed 
the League of Communist of Yugoslavia--hereafter LCY) to the point of breaking 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican . 
In the sixties , there was an improvement in the relations between the 
Catholic Church and the government in Yugoslavia . In 1960 Cardinal Stepinac 
died ; the l eadership of the LCY then changed its tactics and sought to reestablish 
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diplomatic relations with the Vatican d irectly . In 1966, this effort was re­
warded by the signing of a document , Protokol , clarifying the idiosyncratic 
relationship between the church and state in Yugoslavia . This d ispleased 
the Croatian Catholic hierarchy because it felt that the Vatican and Yugoslav 
politicians bypassed them completely in bringing about a decision vital to the ir 
church and their nation • .  In the c ourse of this same year, 1966 , Aleksandar 
Rankovic,vice president and head of the infamous . security police (UDBA) was 
purged from the Party and numerous repressive practices were revealed and 
admitted . It appeared that the anti -centralist , federalist forces had f inally 
won . Roman Cathol ics became hopeful that a new and better period had finally 
arrived for them , too. 
The next decade , however, would demonstrate that their hopes were in vain . 
In 1971 , the entire leadership of the League of Communists of Croatia was forced 
to resign under accusations of liberal ism and exclusivism . There was again a 
sharp turn toward centralism in the Party . The Catholic Church was accused 
of supporting Croatian nationalism and of overt opposition to the policies of 
the CLY . These accusations have been repeated in one form or another for over 
a decade , and the harangue is sti ll going on . 
This sketch of the relati onship between Catholic Church and state in Yugo­
slavia was a necessary prologue to understandine the status of that ·relationship 
today . 
2 .  The Catholic Church i n  Yugoslavia at Present 
Although the objectives of the League of C ommunists of Croatia and League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia are not clear when they attack the Catholic Church 
among Croatians in Yugoslavia , it is a fact that the church continues to be under 
heavy fire . S ome motives ma�ecome clearer if we bear in mind the c oncrete socio­
pol itical factors present in the region and on a global level . For the last few 
years , the Cathol ic Church has been headed by a Slavic Polish Pope , who knows 
firsthand how the commw1ist machinery works and who would not let himself be 
manipulated by well -pol ished propaganda . On the c ontrary , the Polish Pope i s  
very firm i n  pressing the question o f  s oc ial justice and respect o f  human rights .  
Moreover, the Pope speaks Croatian , s ides with the hierarchy o f  the Catholic 
Church in Yugoslavia , and uses every opportunity to encourage the justified 
struggle of the Croati an nation , For the first time in decades the Vatican 
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acknowledges that the Croatian nati on has been frequently wronged and is resolved 
to resist the heavy propaganda on the part of the Yugoslav government. 
In 1980 , Pres ident-for-life Tito d ied . The c ommunist government that he 
left seems to be too afraid of the challenges that history has laid upon i t .  
The economy was in d isarray with a n  over-twenty bi l l i on d ol lars debt t o  the West 
and excessive unemployment . The government was aware t�t a decisive crisi s  c ould 
occur at any moment to threaten the very existence of Yugoslavia , because vari ous 
segments of the populati on--particularly the Croatians and Albanians--were dis­
satisfied . This was also the year of the beginning of the Polish crisis , caused 
by the resoluteness of a frustrated working class , who theoretically is the cen­
tral interest of the C ommuni st Party . It also became apparent that the Catholic 
Church in Poland was the most res�ected authority in the country . 
The Yugoslav government feared the repetiti on of the Poli sh experiment in 
Yugoslavia . One way of preventing this crisis , it dec ided , was to attack the 
Cathol ic Church and oresent it to the people as the most reactionary element of 
the society ,  as a cl ericalist institut i on that harbors and protects fascists , 
and so on . The term " Stepinac church" has been invented to suggest that the 
Catholic Church in Yugoslavia espouses an ideology c ontrary to the interests 
of the C roatian nation. 
The year 1981 was no more favorable to the League, · of C ommunists in Yugo­
slavia than the previ ous year. Already in 1980 , a group of Croatian intell i ­
gentsia, among them two prominent Catholic priests , submitted to the central 
Yugoslav government a request for amnesty for all political prisoners in Yugo� 
slavia and the el iminati on from the criminal statute of the paragraph appl ying 
to ool i tical offenders . The government responded early in 1981 by putting on 
trial some of the most nrominent Croatian inte llectuals such as Dr . Franjo 
Tud jman , former Army general and a l ifelong member of the Communist Party , Dr . 
Marko Veselica , professor of economics and former deputy from Zagreb in the fed­
eral Parl i  a111ent, Vlado Gotovac , the poet and philosopher, Dobroslav Paraga, the 
student lea d e r ,  and others . 
By the end of �larch , Yugoslavia experienced one of its most d ifficult 
crises . The rioting in the autonomous region of Kosovo had to be suppressed 
by the m il itary and oolice . In add ition to all of this , the Western �ress , 
particularly the West European , increased its criticism of the Yugoslav govern-
ment. It had revealed that the Yugoslav government has �en directly in­
volved, through its secret police , with terrorist activity , including the 
assassinations of its own citizens living i n  western countries .  
With this historical background , it is safe t o  assume that the attack 
on the Catholic Church has served two purpose s .  O n  one hand, the Church 
is chosen as the scapegoat for the e conomic and political failure of the 
system. On the other hand, the insiste nce of the Catholic Church on human 
rights has been considered to have a destabilizing effect on the c ountry, 
which also means on the auth<Jri tarian grip of the Communist Party . 
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The position of the Cathclic hierarchy has been unequivocal . Its views 
have most often been presented throu7,h the homilies and pastoral letters of 
Z agreb ' s  Archbishop Franjo Kuharlc, the Fresident of the Epi scopal Conference 
of Yugoslavia.  I n  his 1980 Christman homily , Archbishop Kuhari� clearly stated 
that the Church must protect everything that is human and encourage others to 
respect human rights including the right to practice religion without fear 
and interference . 4  Kuhari� also mentioned the right of the impri soned to be 
respected as hQ�an individuals and not to be exposed to tvrture , i nhuman 
conditions , or solitary confinement in heatless cement cubicle s .  The govern­
ment immediately interpreted the archbishop as taking Croatian political pris­
oners under his wing . Archbishop Kuhari6 reasserted this position during the 
customary visit of all religious representatives to the president of the Croa­
tian Parliament ( Saber) , Jure Bilic', at the beginning of the new year .  He said 
then that the common good is being fulfilled "when the personal , national, and 
religious identity of every person i s  guaranteed, whe n his or her unalienable 
personal dignity is protected , when everyone ' s  freedo• of conscience is secured 
so that he or she may live a private and public life in accordance with his or 
her conviction, when the education of his or her children is entrusted to his 
or her own conscience without interference , when the condi tions pertaining to 
work , living conditions , and spiritual growth which are appropriate to the human 
being are secured • .. 5 
However, soon after these events , a torrent of orchestrated attacks upon 
the Catholic Church began. It was initiated , as we indicated at the beginning 
of this essay , by the President of the Presidency of Croatia ,  Jakov BlaZevic , 
the state prosecutor during the Stepinac trial in 1946 . He was irritated by the 
continuous public veneration of the late cardinal ' s  grave and the Church ' s  pro-
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motion o f  the cause of Cardinal Stepinac ' s  beatification. BlaZevic vehemently 
attacked the church he put on trial and indicated that the present church de-
6 served the same fate . 
In the same speech , BlaZevic reproached some of the e lements in his p arty 
for be lieving that "the first premise of socialism" ought to be respect of 
religious liberties .  He called it a contradiction in adjecto . This i s  indic"" 
tive of the disposition of certain members of the Communist Party in Croatia 
and Yugoslavia. Apparen�ly , there are at least two factions in the Party it­
self regarding religion. One e spouses the conservative , stalinistic ideas of 
religion ( the "opium of people " ) whi ch must be eradicated from the midst of 
humankind . The other faction is more open to contemporary studies and atti­
tudes toward religion and views religion as an important part in the life of 
believers and, thus , as a possible positive e lement for a socialist society. 
In any case , the suppression of religion by administrative measures is consid­
ered by thi s group as not only outmoded but very detrimentai for society. 
This group includes professors and other intellectuals who call themselves 
sociologists or philosophers of religion. It is significant that a number 
of professional Party politicians e spouses these same ideas on religion. 
They are mostly younger Party members who come in conflict with the older, war­
period generation. It i s  safe to assert, however ,  that at present the conser­
vative , combative , centralistic part of the Party has gained the upper hand 
and sets the concrete policie s .  This it true at least i n  Croatia. 
As far as the Catholic Church i n  Yugoslavia is concerned ,  it is not 
without its i nternal divisions . The line of division separates the hierarchy ,  
which has achie ved a surprising degree of consensus regarding the question o f  
the relationship between church and state , on one hand, and a group of theolo­
gians gathered around the C atholic publishing house , "Kr�6anska sada�njost " 
f?hri stian actuality}, and i n  the theological association of the same name . 
The reasons for their disagreements are somewhat obscure . The hierarchy 
was i:rri tated by the very idea of a theological association .  This i s  under­
standable when one remembers that the idea of an association of prie sts has 
a very bad history in the context of Yugoslavia. The government, from the 
very outset , encouraged pri est associati ons , granting to their members a 
privileged status i n  comparison to the non-associated priests and ordinary 
faithful . The hierarchy , for its part ,  i nterpreted these priest-associations as 
a subtle attempt on the government ' s  part at creating divisions withi n the 
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Catholic Church and at exempting a body of the clergy members from hierarchical 
supervision. When, therefore , a group of theologians (made up almost exclusively 
of priests) decided to form an association ,  it reawakened in bishops a sense of 
danger. As a result, many bishops demanded thE:: dismantling of the association ,  
and some (like Franic, the diocese of Split) forbade the members of the as­
sociation ,  to do a:ny pastoral work in their dioceses.  Theologians., , for their 
part, complain, albeit privately, that bishops have an antiquated idea of the 
Church and that they are generally too conservative . Their conservatism, some 
theologians believe , has damaging ramifications on the political scene as well . 
These theologians, most of them more immediately engw;ed in the work of 
"Kr�canska sada�njost" ,  believe that bishops should publically endorse the so­
called self-goverPing socialism of Yugoslavia and invite the faithful to do the 
same . The Croatian people as a whole and the Catholic Church in particular, they 
contend , would benefit from this change of attitude on the part of the hierarchy. 
Some bishops also have problems with the Franciscans . This is particularly 
the case in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The bone of contention is the control of 
parishes . Ever since the Turks captured these lands, the FranCiscans were , for 
all practical purposes ,  the only nastors in this region. Recently, however, 
some bishops (Hostar and Sarajevo dioceses) have had an increase in priestly 
vocations without having enough· parishes in which to place their priests. They 
sought a solutj_on of this problem by taking awa:y a number of parishes from 
the Franciscans. This ctcew a swift, sometimes even violent,  reaction from both 
the Franciscan. fathers and their faithful. Only recently have these problems 
begun to approach a settlement. Some are quick to note that this is a direct 
result of the Blessed Virgin ' s  invitation to peace during her alleged appa.ri tions 
to some young girls and boys in the. summer of 1981 in Medjugorje , Hercego.vina. 
Although these divisions. are hurting the Church enormously and are definitely 
perceived by the faithful as scandalous, the attention of the Catholic Church 
in Yugoslavia as a whole is presently focused in the relationship between the 
Chruch and the communist goverr�ent. To the escalating attacks on the Church, 
which were mentioned earlier, the hierarchy responded once again through Franjo 
Kuharic, the Archbishop of Zagreb. The occasion was the anniversary of the death 
of Cardinal Stepinac . 'l'he Z agreb Cathedral and the square in front held about 
ten thousand who sensed that something decisive was about to happen. Kuhari� ' s  
homily was that event. After expressing his hopes that, at some time in the 
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future , an impa.riaJ. judgment would be passed on the role of' the Catholic 
Church and its most famous representative Cardinal Stepinac during the war, 
the archbishop refuted one by one the standard government accusations of the 
lat� Cardinal and the Catholic Church. He pointed out that the documentation 
and the final speech of' Cardinal Stepinac 's  defense lawyers has never been 
published in Yugoslavia, whereas the allegations of' the prosecutor have been 
repeated over and over as proof' of' the Cardinal ' s  criminal activity .  
This speech did not gladden the Party policymakers . They forbade the 
publisher of the Catholic biweekly, Glas Koncila, to publish Kuharid ' s  
speech.  The hierarchy , howe:ver, seemed to be fully behind the Archbishop of 
Zagreb. After their conference at Zagreb in the end of April 1981, they pub­
lished a communique defending themselves against the customary accusation of 
meddling in politics. They also reasserted their responsibility to express 
moral judgment when human rights are in question, and to protect their faith­
fUl from agressive government-sponsored atheism. They concluded by pointing out 
areas of civic life in which religious and human li beri ties are impaired. 7 
Theologians, for their part, mostly do not s� much. They seem to avoid 
quarrels with the official segment of the League of Communists.  Instead, 
they engage in intellectual diaJ.ogue with the i'larxist sociologists of religion 
which, for the most part, is innocuous and fairly ineffective . 8 Often the 
writings of these scholars give the impression that they know their argumentations 
are useless be cause thay cannot shape the concrete policies .  Theologians af­
filiated with Jtr�canska sada�njost believe that the progressive elements in the 
l€��e of Communists will eventually prevail and that they would then have a 
partner in dialogue . But they have to deal with the fact that such hopes have 
been too frequently unfulfilled. 
A few words should be said about the e cumenical movement in Yugoslavia. 
'I'he truth is that there is not much more than a few words to say. The various 
nations in Yugoslavia must first learn to live with each other. The historical 
ballast is too heavy to be easily disposed of; deep-seated mistrust is still 
too strong to allow the respective nations to come closer to each other. This 
is particularly the case with the Croatian and Serbian nations .  Unlike anywhere 
else , ecumenism in Yugoslavia is politically col0red and _politically sensitive-.  
There is still the feeling among Croatians that the Orthodox population in 
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Croatia i s  used qy the Serbian hegemonists , represented by the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, to realize the unfilfilled dream of Great Serbia and conversely Serbians 
fear that e cumenism is a new attempt to turn them into "uniate .. churches .  
Ecumenism could perhaps make faster progress i f  the Orthodox of Croatia estab­
lish their mm autocephalous Orthodox Church . It. is a fact , after all ,  that the 
Ca tho lie Church and the Hacedonian Orthodox Church axe engaged in a vigorous 
and fruitful dialogue , whi ch is not the case be tween the Catholic Church and the 
Serbian Orthodox Chur.ch. Nonetheless , e cumenism is by no means dead in Yugoslavia. 
For the most part, however, it is limited to the conversations between the 
theologians of various churches .  Periodical get-togethers of the representatives 
of Catholic and Orthodox theology faculties have becone a tradition. In the 
opinion of many C atholic s ,  the Serbian Orthodox Church would like to engage in 
serious dialogue with the Catholic Church if the latter was kneeling . Conversely 
many Ortholox feel that the Catholic Church has the same aspirations in regard 
to the Serbian Orthodox Church . 
J .  A FeH Personal Pronositions 
'This e ssa;y has centered on the relationship between the C atholic Church 
and the communist government in Yugoslavia. In the final secti on of this 1::o::ief 
essa;y , I would lilr..e to suggest some ideas that might help clarify certain issues 
regarding the relationship between church and state . 
The first point that appears to be crucial is that the church as a religious 
organization is not political in nature and, consequently , that it cannot have 
a;rry political goals in the daily exercise of its mission. This must be said 
in spite of, and in face of the historical experience that Christian churches 
( as 1fell as other organized religions) have engaged in political activity . This 
admission must be made in a spirit of confession and as a corrective to the 
future involvement of the church in the world . 
To assert that the Christian church must not be a political organiz ation 
does not mean, hm·rever ,  that it doe:::; not have political relevance . The 
Yugoslav government , like other communist regimes ,  has attempted to make religious 
organizations "sacristy organizations . .. It should not be forgotten that religion 
:: s  a vision of life concerned uith humanity ' s  well-being and happiness. Inspired 
by the vision of human life brought about by Jesus of Nazareth, the Christian rel:i­
gj on should oppose anything that diminishes the personal dignity of men and women 
and support everything that adva.rJ.ces hu.lJlan welfare . In our time , this concern 
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for individuaJ. well-being has been expressed in terms o f  human rights, a con­
cern 'Hhich the church perceives as a reflection of its very being .  The LCY 
should be aware of this nevr self-understc..nding of the chur.ch, reaJ.izing that 
it cannot be disposed of by repressive means . Here importantly 0 the LCY should 
be avra.re that the church ' s  concern for all that is human cannot hinder but can 
only assist the gover.n.,�tent 1 s efforts for improving the eccnomic , sociaJ., and 
poll ticaJ. well-being of its citizens . The LCY should expect as well as accept 
the possitility that the organized church will, follo1dl1b the dictates of its 
Oi'1"Tl mission among men and women, be cri ticaJ. of some governmental policies and 
practice s .  The government can use this critical posture outside its own ranks 
as a welcome catalyst for the oft acknouled.ged need fer self-criticism. This 
process m� be the be st substitute for a multi-party system--absolutely for­
bidden in Yugoslavia--rdthout any threat to the political dominance of the 
CoiiUllunist Party. 
The church, for its part, should change some of its ways in regard to the 
government. It should be come ml'are that it does not have absolute solutions 
for a:nythil1b and that its cri ticaJ. posture tonard the socio-poli ticaJ. concrete­
ness must at the same tL'Tle be an equally critical posture tonard itself, 
particularly tolrard its reli�:P-osi ty. Consequently 9 the church should take to 
heart the government ' s  criticism and use it judiciously as a catalyst for the 
rather in..-f':requently aclmonledged need for self-criticism. 
The uniting point between the Catholic Church arui the League of Communists 
of Croatia must be the nell-being of the Croatian people . The source of most, 
if not of all difficulties in the area of relationship betl·reen the Church and 
Party in Croatia is tl:e abandonment by both of promoting what is in the best 
interests of the people . In short, both the Party and the Church have been 
more involved vdth ideological battles than with the well-being of Croatian 
nen and women living in the Yugoslav territory. 
From the standpoint of the Croatian nation, both the Church and the Party 
have falled it. If both of these antagonistically positioned factors once 
realize the truth of their failure toward the people , rerhaps this enlighten­
ment might mark for then the begiw..ing of a qualitatively different relationship . 
I suspect that the underlying element of many verbal fusillades between the 
Catholic Church and the League of Comnunists of Croatia is the implied mutual 
accusation of betrayal of the Croatian people . The paradox is that both of them 
are right. Hhat is required now is an open admission of "guilt" by both, a 
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rededication and collaboration tm·rarcl the common goal of promoting the interests 
of the Croatian people . The historical moment is critical ; thus , the joining of 
efforts by the League of Conmumists and the Catholic Church is nnich more crucial 
than ever before . 
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